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JEFF GRIFFIN

The State of Exception in Film:
Cloverfield and 24
Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, and Waite~. ~enjamin ~~ve
discussed the centrality of the "state of exception 1 1n the pohtical
sphere. Despite their disagreements, they all concede in o~e way or
another that sovereign power hinges on the state of exceptio.n. I~ the
modern West, the state of exception has become a constitutional
paradigm.z The current "War on Terror," which declares open
hostilities on a de-localized, disembodied enemy that has yet to be
determined,3 turns the state of exception into the raison d'etre. In his
September 20, 2001 Congressional address, President Bush stated,
"our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated." 4 The emergency situation becomes
I use "state of emergency," "state of siege," and "state of exception". sy~onomously.
z Agamben offers a brief history of the state of exception ~n i~ const1tution~l usage,
beginning with Articl e 14 of French Constitution of 22 Fnma1re Year 8, wh1ch granted
the sovereign the power to "make the regulations and ordi~ances neces.sary ~o~ t~e
execution of the laws and the security of the State (11). Th1s clause has 1ts ongm m
Napoleon's decree of December 24, 1811 granting the empe:or the power to decl~re
whether or not a city was in a state of siege, and take ex~eptional pow~rs to avert 1t
(4). Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution gave the Pres1dent of the Re1ch the P?wer to
declare a state of siege and, if necessary suspend the fundamental rights listed m th~
constitution (14). On August 3, The Swiss Federal Asse~bly gave. the Federal C?,uncll
full power to ensure the "security, integrity, and neutrahty of.Swltzerland (16).
.
Article 1 of the United States Constitution allows the suspens1on of Habeas Corpus m
times of rebellion invasion or for the sake of public safety. Article 2 gives the
president the titl~ of Commander and Chief of the armed for~es (20): Giorgio
Agamben State of Exception trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: Umv of Ch1cago Press, 2005).
3 The Bush Administration's' political use of the word terror conflates widely dispara~e
strategies with readily identifiable subjects. But his public rhetorical us~ of ~he term lS
not consistent with Its use in official State Department reports and pubhcat10ns, and
neither are the definitions in these reports consistent. See Tilly, 2004. The Department
of Defense defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence.
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." U.S. State De~artment,
"Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology, Office of the
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, ttp:/ fwww.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.}
4 Ibid.
1
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an interminable and potential legal operation in which, "the very
distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil
war) becomes impossible."s
Before I begin the discussion on the representative aspect of law,
I should clarify my own use of "representation," as well as my
discussion of the state of exception as a representation vs. an
objective reality. I use "representation" broadly to refer to
conventional media through which we come to know the world,
whether language, images, or sounds. Because formal knowledge is
only possible through normal referencing, it is inherently
problematic to discuss the state of exception as an "objective reality,"
and I forgo any attempts to do so. As Schmitt notes, "There exists no
norm that is applicable to chaos." 6 Rather, I wish to demonstrate how
fundamental elements of jurisprudence and sovereignty are put into
play in particular films, as well as in cinematic production in general.
In its broad usage, the state of exception is a term that signifies a
purely potential event. As an object of language, the state of
exception marks the limit point of juridical competence, and ushers
in a period of action without legal representation. Agamben's critical
analysis of the "state of exception" makes use of a sort of Hegelian
logic that couples the exception to the rule in a unity of difference.
"What is excluded in the exception," he writes, "maintains itself in
relation to the rule in the form of the rule's suspension. The rule
applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it"
(original italics)?
In his analysis of law and the theory of
sovereignty, Agamben suggests that this relationship precludes a
formal existence of a juridical "outside" or rather, a distinction
between any outside and inside. In his discussion of the state of
nature via Hobbes, Agamben claims that the state of nature is the
"being-in-potentiality of the law, the law's presupposition as 'natural
law."8 By moving the discussion from the objective presence of the
signified to the object's potential to be present, Agamben avoids
describing the "state of exception" or the "state of nature" in terms of
any inherent qualities and falling into the same trap against which
his polemic is aimed.
5

Agamben, State of Exception, 22.
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trahs. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005), 13.
7
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller·
Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 17-18.
8 Ibid., 37.
6
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But while Agamben discusses the state of exception as a politic~}
paradigm, I wish to discuss it as a cultural .p.aradig~. The reaso~ IS
that in very obvious ways culture and politics are Inter-formative.
The "ticking-bomb" hypothesis, discussed below, h~s become. a
regular academic exercise in judicial policy and ethics folloWing
September 11th. "Terrorism" and "catastrophe," as spatially abstract
concepts that refer to temporal occurrences, are made tangible in
and through the "news." As I will show, they are ~lso made re~l. by
virtue of a sovereign declaration. Agamben s own political
philosophy is informed by his earlier work a.esthetics, .a~~ he owes
much of his thought to Walter Benjamin s hterary cnticism. As a
political paradigm, the state of exception, according to. Aga~be~, ha.s
become a normal legal operation in terms of its potential. L1kew1se, It
has become a regular feature of cultural production, as images of
war, disaster, crisis, and terror proliferate in theaters and
newspapers alike.9 This corresponds, in turn, to the nov~l me~ns of
representing war through television and cinema. In my discussion of
the "ticking bomb" hypothesis, I will show how catastrophe ente~s
into the repertoire of legal and ethical discourse and how this
discourse both anticipates violence (as torture) and tries to manage
and contain it. This is a precursor to my discussion of the
representation of catastrophe in the film Cloverfield~ 0 an~ the
management of violence in the series 24. 11 I end with ~ d~sc~sswn. of
these films as part of a larger fiction of sovereign continuity In which
the capture, suspension, and ritualization of anomie space become
normal operations.

!n

II.

Constitutional law is always involved in the act of representation
by codifying norms into legally binding rules. According to Sc~~itt,
constitutional theorists often isolate the norm from the decisiOn,
privileging the former at the expense of the latter. s~~h. a~proaches
misconstrue the nature of sovereignty or even eliminate the
sovereign" from the theoretical model. "But every gener~l n~rm," he
argues, "demands a normal everyday frame of life to which It can be

The U.S. State Department lists nearly the same number of "significant terrorist .
incidents" between 2000-2003 as 1963-1999. State Department, "Significant Terronst
Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology."
10 Matt Reeves, "Cioverfield," (United States: Paramount, 2008).
11 )oel and Robert Cochran Surnow, in 24, ed. joel Surnow (United States: Fox Network,

9

2001-2007).
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factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations." 1 2 By
virtue of its power to suspend the normal order, the sovereign
implicitly decides what constitutes the normal state of affairs by
withholding that power. As Wittgenstein reminds us, the practical
use of language erodes in a state in which normal uses are not
applied. 13 In the Philosophical Investigations, he would devalue the
import he previously ascribed to propositional language and stress
heterogeneous linguistic usages in various contexts. 14 Propositional
language is but one of a multiplicity of "language games." To Schmitt,
the sovereign decision to suspend the law reduces the norm to a
pure application. The coincidence between the linguistic and the
juridical stated here is synthesized by Agamben:
In the relation between the general and the particular (and all the
more so in the case of the application of a juridical norm), it is not
only a logical subsumption that is at issue, but first and foremost
the passage from a generic proposition endowed with a merely
virtual reference to a concrete reference to a segment of reality.
This passage from langue to parole, or from the semiotic to the
semantic, is not a logical operation at all; rather, it always entails a
practical activity, that is, the assumption of langue by one or more
speaking subjects and the implementation of that complex
apparatus that Benveniste defined as the enunciative function,
which logicians tend to undervalue.1s

In the case of language, the propositional statement, or language
as a "picture of the world," dissolves into various semantic acts at the
level of enunciation. In the juridical sphere, law, in the constitutional,
normative, or signifying sense, dissolves into a "decision [made] in
absolute purity." 16 And the space in which this occurs in both cases is
the state of exception, to which we will now turn.

12
13

Schmitt, Political Theolooy, 13.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophicallnvestioations, trans. G.E.M. Anscom be, Third ed.
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
14 The Tractatus of earlier Wittgenstein posits the "picture theory" of language, in
which the world Is determined by facts (1.11) given to us in pictures (2.141) and
articulated through propositions (3.1) (Wittgensteln, 2003 #21). The later
Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier tendency to contain "meaning" within logical
pictures. "For a large class of cases ..." he states, "the meaning of a word Is Its use in
the language" ( Ibid. par 43).
15 Agamben, State of Exception, 39.
1 6 Schmitt, Political Theolooy, 13.
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THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF POWER

The state of exception has been a point of frustration for legal
theorists and jurists alike. Agamben writes that they "se~m t~ r~g~rd
the problem more as a quaestio facti than as a genuine JUridical
problem," and they assume that "state of necessity," which f?unds
the exception, "cannot have juridical form." 17 ~nd ye.t, as S~hm1tt has
shown, the exception is precisely that which gtves ~Ife }~ the
sovereign. "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception, IS the
famous opening line of Political Theology. 18 Here he locates the
originary place of sovereignty in the decision to ~usp~nd the
normally existing juridical order in an eme.rgenc~ .situ:tion. But
Schmitt insists on the absolute legality of this decision: Although
[the sovereign] stands outside the normally valid l.egal system, he
nonetheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether t~e
19
constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety."
While
Agamben agrees that the sovereign ultimately decides on the
exception, he views the work of Schmitt as part of a strate~ to lend
cohesion to a radical form of sovereignty whose gradual
exacerbation of the use of the state of exception" threatened to
disrupt that unity.2o To Agamben, this unity and cohesion are part of
a mythos of power that attempts to secun~ the r~surrection of the
constituted order following the proclamation of Its annulment, or
annex the state of exception to the rule. He concludes that the state
of exception is an anomie, unlocalizable, and contestable space t~~t,
in a formal sense, requires the intercession of a "force .of law, In
which "on one hand, the norm is in force but is not apphed and, on
21
the other, acts that do not have the value of law acquire its 'force.'
Even more, Schmitt's attempt to maintain the legal status of the
sovereign decision in the state of excepti~n. is . ultimately selfdestructive, because it hinges upon ~ clear d1sttnct10n betwe~n t~ ~
rule and the exception: "[the rule] denves only from the exce~tion.
Insofar as this distinction is evident, the state of exception can
23
maintain the "specifically juristic element" of the pure decision. But
when the two elements become confused and ultimately

2

Agamben, State of Exception, 1.
1o Schmitt, Political Theology, 5.
19
lbid.,7.
d dd .
20 He is referring specifically to the Weimar Constitution which was suspen e
urmg
the Third Reich. Agamben, State of Exception, 34.
21 Ibid., 38.
2 2 Schmitt, Political Theology, 15.
23 Ibid., 13.

17
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undecidable, Schmitt's entire program loses its juridical coherence.
At this point, Agamben offers a reading of Walter Benjamin, which is
crucial to the understanding of his own analysis of the relationship of
law and praxis. In his eighth thesis of the philosophy of history,
Benjamin states, "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the
'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the
rule." 24 This simple proposition blurs the norm/exception distinction
and thus prefigures the opening of a juridically formless space.
Hence, when Benjamin states shortly after, " .. .it is our task to bring
about a real state of emergency," 25 he is positioning revolutionary
violence within an anomie space where it is juridically indistinct
from sovereign violence. Schmitt's analysis of the state of exception
is thus realigned with every such fiction constructed upon and
suspended within an inherent "juridical void" that is nonetheless
strategically decisive for the juridical order.26
Agamben's reading of Schmitt in contrast to Benjamin reveals
the basis for his analysis of law and praxis. In fact, two levels of
analysis can be located through his work: the abstract-logical and the
practical-enunciative. In reality, his thought oscillates between these
two poles, highlighting a fundamental disjunction between "language
and the world" (or norm and application).27 On the level of discourse,
language represents the world through denotation, while on the level
of enunciation, which refers to the mere "taking place"2B of speech,
language is reduced to a pure event and signifies before all else the
fact of signification itself (or the intention to signify).29 This
implicates a dual subject, who, through a process of both withholding
and suspension, is solely present in voice or parole, and absent in
discourse, and who represented in discourse or langue, and absent in
voice. If a political community is understood as the place of norms,
laws, or justice, and the political subject as both pre-political and
politically capable (as in Aristotle's notion of "political animal") we
can say that the presence of a subject as animal is both suspended
within and excluded from a political identity within a community. In
Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in 11/uminations: Essays and
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 257.
25 Ibid.
26 Agamben, State of Exception, 51.
27 Ibid., 40.
28
Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 116.
29 - - -, "The Idea of Language," in Potentialities: Collected Essays In Philosophy, ed.
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 42.
24
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articulating this bond between language and politics, Ag~mb~n
writes, "The living being has logos by taking away and conserving Its
own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting his own bare
life be excluded, as an exception, within it. 30 This is the basis of
Agamben's thesis on sovereign power and "bare life," in which both
the former and the latter are "captured out" (as in ex-capere) of the
normative, political sphere and are exposed as bare-life-as-such in
the state of exception.
While the exception is persistent is any normal state of affairs,
the state of exception is problematic both theoretically and
practically. Theoretically, because, as mentioned above, it ~resents a
contestable and anomie space, and practically because It can be
neither wholly contained nor exhausted in discourse. But insof~r ~s
the state of exception is originary to sovereign power, It IS
conceptually available to formal knowledge as a relation . .Equ~lly
problematic is the conceptualization of catastrophe that Inspires
"anomie terror" which, in turn, lends juridical consistency to the
state of exception.31 The possibility of catastrophic phenomena,
according to Schmitt, is the ultimate guarantor of sovereign power.
But even he was aware of the problems involved in codifying a norm
prior to a catastrophic event: "The precise details of an emergen:y
cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place 1n
such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extre~e
emergency and of how it is to be eliminated". 32 This is why Schmitt
shifts the figure of the sovereign from the constitut~on to the figu~e
that is delegated the authority to decide, "what constituted the ~ub.hc
interest of the state, public safety and order ... and so on (1tahcs
added)."33 And insofar as the sovereign decides what action to take
in light of a catastrophe, he implicitly decides on the very fact of the
catastrophic occurrence; that is to say, the sovereign spea~s ~he
catastrophe into existence. Catastrophe, rather than an objective
situation, is the anomie potential contained within the so~er~ign's
person, whose latent or virtual presence guarantees the continuity of
sovereign power and whose actual appearance coincides with the
sovereign proclamation of a state of emergency.
.
.
Thus, catastrophe emerges from within the soveretgn 1n a
juridically formless space. From the logical-abstract level of
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 8.
State of Exception, 66.
Political Theology, 7.

30Agamben,
31 - - - ,
32 Schmitt,

33

lbid., 6.
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investigation, it is possible to construct a formal model of the state of
exception suspended and maintained within the constituted legal
apparatus through the spectral presence of the "force of law without
law." 34 In his discussion of iustitium, Agamben attempts to bring the
analysis closer to the practical-enunciative level. He traces festivals
of mourning and anomie feasts such as Carnival, to the Roman
iustitium, a proclamation of a state of emergency that temporarily
suspended legal prohibitions, public duties, obligations, and
institutional authority. Both ancient and modern scholars have
struggled to define the "nature of acts committed during iustitium."3S
Most often, they invoke the right of self-defense as a shared interest
between citizen and state. 36 At the very moment in which positive
law recedes in the face of terror, the "law of necessity" ascends and
binds the self-preservation of the state to that of the citizen. But what
is the legal meaning of those acts committed during iustitium? Can
one speak of a violation? "What is a human praxis," Agamben asks,
"that is wholly delivered over to a juridical void?"37 And, for that
matter, what are the legal consequences of those acts? The difficulty
in thinking these questions concerns a crisis of representation and
marks the limit point of juridical competence. This crisis occurs
because the taking place of the state of exception cannot be wholly
anticipated nor represented by law. At the moment of its declaration,
the state of emergency brings about the end of law as a
representative, signifying force, and the beginning of pure non represent activity. This is parallel to the linguistic act of enunciation in
which re-present propositional language recedes into "the event of
language as such, which by definition is ephemeraJ."3B We cannot
derive a criterion of judgment to apply to the events that took place
in the state of exception (iustitium), and neither did such a criterion
determine those events. This is why Agamben calls those events,
"mere facts". 39 Law, as a virtual signifier, fractured from any
reference to the world, gives way to pure praxis.

34

{Agamben, State of Exception, 38.
Ibid., 49.
36 Ibid., 43.
37 Ibid., 49.
38
- - - ,Remnants ofAuschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, 138.
39
- - -,State of Exception, SO.
35
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III. THE TICKING BOMB AND ITS SUCCESSORS
Imagine this: a bomb is set to detonate in a crowded
metropolitan area and authorities have apprehended a suspect They
are sure that the suspect has planted the bomb and have limited time
to find it All non-violent options have been exhausted. Would
torturing the suspect for information be ethical in this case, or should
the law ban torture in all cases?
The ticking bomb has become a staple for the Ame~ican .political
palate. The popular media and the scholarly community ahke have
invoked it to wage arguments for or against the legitimate use of
torture.40 These arguments attempt, in various ways, to compensate
for a juridical or ethical lacuna that ope.n s . up in the ,emerg:ncy
situation. David Luban argues that the tickmg bomb cheats by
already stipulating the condition of epistemic certainty where, in
reality, certainty is improbable. 41 Allhof Fritz, on the other hand,
argues that this is beside the point; it is perfectly acceptable to wage
an ethical argument upon purely idealized situationS. 42 Their
arguments are both correct but not mutually exc!~sive. In .the case ?f
Luban, the improbability of certain prior conditiOns bemg .met 1n
actual practice is sufficient grounds for skepticism. For Fn~, .~e
actual taking-place of the event is irrelevant insofar as the possibility
exists. In either case, we have gotten nowhere because the event that
This lis t is not exhaustive, but it represen ts the main lines of discussion: See Alan M.
Dershowitz "Want to Torture? Get a Warrant," San Francisco Chronicle, January 22,
2002 2002.: Allhof Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, Ticking TimeBombs and Moral Justification," International journal ofAp~lie~ Phi~osophy 19, no. 2
(2005)., Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, T1ckmg T1me-Bombs and
Moral Justification.", Karen J. Greenberg, ed. The Torture Debate i~ Amerca (New
York: Cambridge University Press,2006)., Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About
Torture: It's Time to Be Honest About Doing Terrible Things.," The Week(y
Standard 11, no. 12 (2005), http:/ jwww.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/
printer_preview.asp?idArticle=6400&R=C80E3672C. Scott ~orton, "How Hollywood
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Ticking) Bomb," V1tal Speech~s ofth~ Day
74, no. 4 (2008)., John Kleinig, "Ticking Bombs and Torture Warrants •. D~akm Law"
Review 10, no. 2 (2005)., David Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the T1ckmg Bomb,
Virginia Law Review 91, no . 6 (2005)., and Leonard and Andrew Healy Wantchekon,
"The "Game" Of Torture," The journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999).
41 Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb," 1442.
.
.
42 His argument is a purely philosophical/ethical argument. One could obJe~t that his
criteria are different from that of a legal argument, but I disagree. The eth1cal models
he uses In his argument are all, in some ways, incorporate~ in the ot~ers' arguments.
Furthermore, torture is still technically illegal in the US (w1th exceptiOn~ of course),
so everyone incorporates a different criterion based on ethical assumptions. See
Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, Ticking Time-Bombs and Moral
Justification," 247.

40
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we are speaking of has never occurred. By this I mean that a similar
occurrence will never exhaust the ticking-bomb question. To be sure,
there are real-life examples that seem congruent with the
hypothetical scenario. 43 But the ticking-bomb scenario hovers
between the virtual and the reat demanding a decision where, in
fact there is no place of application. It requires a normative answer
to an exceptional situation.
Any author who confronts the ticking-bomb hypothesis must
organize his or her strategies against an "empty space." My intention
is not to dismiss such strategies outright, but rather to highlight the
place of frustration that pits judicial prudence against judicial
efficacy. To take up one is to weaken the other. To maintain both, as
Fritz does, requires an ethics waged within a purely virtual space
divorced from both legal reference and practical judgment. In terms
of its concrete application, however, the question is not so much
whether the actual act of torture could be ethicat but whether or not
it can be managed, coordinated, systematized, and articulated within
any applicable, theoretical model. Matthew Hannah is right to
suggest that the popularity of and debates surrounding the ticking
bomb hypothesis make it possible to see torture as part of "a
symmetrical reversal of and geopolitical response to the threat of
terrorism." 44 That is, terrorism, at the limit point of juridical
competence, constitutes an exceptional and destabilizing threat that
is countered with an exceptional response. But it is a mistake to
construe the act of torture as automatically tied to a given juridicat
geopoliticat or biopolitical model. When the images of Abu Ghraib
were leaked to the public, public outrage was aimed at the character
of violence that took place. In the media, the image of bureaucratized
discipline confronted the image of excess and sadism in an
environment in which "Army regulations and the Geneva
conventions were routinely violated.''45 However, a particular logic
governed the abuses at the prison that defied official guidelines and
conventions, and followed more elementary rituals of power
relations between empowered and disempowered, occupier and

occupied.46 While the purpose of the acts may have coincided with
the interests of the state in the last instance (detainment, discipline,
information, etc.) the means by which these ends were secured fell
outside the boundary of institutional management and delegation,
leading to a situation in which it becomes impossible to determine
exactly for whom the violent acts were administered. Hence, the
problem is inevitably construed as a deficit in oversight and
surveillance. In this opaque, unbounded region, sovereignty changes
hands fluidly and indiscreetly, and the possession of violence itself
becomes the object of struggle. The ticking bomb hypothesis deploys
the element of urgency that severs the tie between agent/institution,
power;authority, norm/ decision, exploiting a fundamental juridical
fact echoed in Schmitt's observation that, "all law is situational
law."47 But even in his own terms, it is unclear who holds the
"monopoly to decide" in this scenario. 48 As a hypothetical situation,
the ticking bomb situation is always already beyond normative
judgment, and constitutes a "real state of emergency" in Benjamin's
terms, in which sovereign violence is ultimately indistinct from any
other act of violence.
Those who support torture in the ticking-bomb scenario often
cite "necessity." But who decides what is necessary, and when does
this decision acquire its legal force? In normal situations, laws and
conventions delegate the proper authority and prescribe the means
(or at least establish limits) through which decisions are to be
carried out Ideally, at least, law represents these acts through their
duration. The extreme situation falls beyond the competence of legal
calculation, and acts carried out therein are momentarily severed
from legal representation. Necessity becomes a mechanism to
ensure the juridical continuity of violence, if only after the fact The
Israeli lawyer, Shai Nitzen, in defense of the state authorization of
torture, invokes the law of necessity and cites a statute that absolves
Israeli officials from criminal liability, provided their acts were
"required to prevent immediate serious harm and there was no other
way to achieve their goal."49 Even after the court decided to ban
torture, it still left open the possibility that, in an actual ticking-bomb
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scenario, an agent could resort to torture and use the "law of
necessity" as a legal defense.50 Human rights groups argue that the
necessity defense is only applicable after the fact. Ala n Derschowitz,
while normatively opposed to torture, has "no doubt" that in the
ticking-bomb scenario the agent who holds the suspect would
torture the victim. The question is whether the tor ture should occur
outside the law or within it. 51 Requiring that agents obtain torture
warrants prior to th e actual torture would bring an inevitable
torture into legal jurisdiction prior to the act The difference between
Dershowitz's suggestion a nd the Is raeli court's decision is simply the
anterior or posterior place of judgment. The assumption that torture
would be in evitabl e or necessary removes it from the hand of the
agent while the decision of the court places the torture into the
hands of the state. But Dershowitz, who acknowledges the potency of
the ticking-bomb situation, down plays the immanence of the crisis it
presents. His suggestion, in his own terms, is only applicable for
those cases in which the ticking-bomb leaves the agent enough time
to obtain a warra nt. And if it is true that the agent would resort to
torture in any case, the legal meaning of torture in a ll other cases is
still unclear. In his argument against the ticking-bomb hypothesis, it
is appropriate that David Luban, citing Wittgenstein, writes,
"Confusion arises when we become bewitched by a picture."52 But it
not so much a matter of comparing the picture wi th a given r eality,
as it is recognizing the fact that the reality to which w e a re referr ing
has no applicabl e form: its form is constitu ted through the ta king
place of the event. Such an event is not an obj ect of knowledge at all,
rather it is perhaps a nalogous to what Wittgenstein called the
"mystical," which mer ely "shows itself."S3 In what follows, I take up a
discussion of film in this context. I intend to show how strategies
waged against the ticking-bomb hypothesis a nticipate formal
elements of film production in general, and the representation of the
state of exception in pa rticular.
Where scholars have fall en short of providing a nswers,
filmmakers have risen to prominence. Cloverfield a nd 24 are more
"complete" answers to the question because, as films in general, they
50
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are capable of capturing a procession of events that are unmediated
by speech. Fil ms can show series of occurrences without word~.
Kommerell, the German literary critic claimed that speech 1s
"originary gesture."S4 In Agamben's reading of Kommerell, "gesture is
not so much a prelinguistic content" as it is a cipher of mankind's
"speechless dwelling in language" 55 As mentioned above, this
"speechless dwelling" is the place in which the elemental voice of the
subject is captured and suspended, as an exception, within discourse.
In cinema, the place of representation is located between gesture and
speech, intention and act Because movies are transmissible through
a minimum of denotation, they "oscillate forever between reality and
virtuality, life and art, the singular and the generic."56 They lie on a
second order of seeing, one that excludes the viewer as participant
but includes it as spectator. Thus, they are capable of bridging the
gap between a particular event hidden from formal knowledge and a
representation already capable of mass transmission. This is because
reproducibility is inherent to the film's production. The entire
technological ensemble called into the work of productio~ i~
organized upon this task. "The equipment-free aspect of reahty,
writes Benjamin, "here has become the height of artifice." 57
CLOVERFIELD

In Cloverfield, as in 24, artifice reaches its limit point. In the
former, the events play out in real-time, and the camera bridges the
temporal world of the viewer with the virtual world of the actors.
The latter involves a group of friends, Rob (Michael Stahl-Davis), Hud
(T.J. Miller), Marlena (Lizzy Capla n), Lily (Jessica Lucas), and Beth
(Odette Yusman), w hose going away party for Rob is cut short by an
invasion of monsters, although this is o nly gradually made clear. The
plot is driven by an attempt to rescue Beth, and is perhaps secondary
to the film's presentation of catastrophe. We are (supposedly)
watching a digital recording from Hud's camera, and Hud struggles
to steady the camera while fleeing for his life.

54

Giorgio Agamben, "Kommerell, or on Gesture," in Potentialities: Collected Essays in
Ph ilosophy, ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 78.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 80.
57
Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in
11/uminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books,
1968), 233.

87

G RIFFIN

S TATE OF EXCE PTION IN FI LM

In Cloverfield the camera is incorporated into the fi lm as a
subject. In Vertov's Man with a Movie Cam era,ss the point-of-view
shifts between multiple cameras. At times the viewer is presented
shots of the filmmaker shooting the film. The illusion of the objective
eye is effaced by the ostensive focus of a second camera onto the
first, and, immediately, a second orde r of seeing is inaugurated
before an invisible camera. Using this technique, Ver tov parlays an
artifice of theatrics for a theatrics of a rtifice. In Cloverfield, the first
and second orders of seeing are contained w ithin a s ingle camera,
and the film achieves its illusion by binding the ca mera, as an
objective r ecorder, to the phys iological limitations of the characters.
But the film can only be seen in contrast with the p resent
conventions of filmmakin g that incorporate sharp resolutions,
command all aspect of colors, hues, and shadows, a nd capture the
most intimate gestures a nd fl eeting expressions of the cha racters on
screen, even as the camera dissimulates its own participation in the
events. Cloverfield excha nges a ll this for a shaky camerama n and
grainy foo tage. That is, Cloverfield already a nticipates one's
acclimation towards standard techniques of filmmaking and
attempts to thwart it.
Because the cam era plays the dual role of subjective pa rticipant
and obj ective observer, Cloverfield can display catastrophe as a lived
event. Benjamin was attuned to cha nges occurring in lyr ic poetry,
particularly through the works of Ba udela ire. Baudelaire wa nted to
guard himself against the experience of the "shock" -- the unguarded
experience of a moment -- so he placed its poetic produ ction at the
center of his work. In that the crisis is secured as a poetic
representa tion, the latter takes on the "character of having been
lived in the strict sense."S9 To perform this Sisyph ean task, one must
construct a representation that mimics the intangibili ty or
singularity of the experience of shock (a flash... then nig ht!
[Baudelaire]). According to Benjamin, photography "gave the
moment a posthumous shock" by capturing the singularity of the
event onto an infinitely reproducibl e medium. In film, "the shock is
established as a formal principle."6o The consequence of th e shock as
a formal principle of the artistic production is the subj ect's

"emancipation from experiences."61 Films radically alienat~ the
viewers from the lived experience in exchange for a radically
intimate representation of that experience. According to Robert
Baird, however, the lived experience is momentarily awakened
through the effect of "startle" in film, which takes the form of
imperceptible bodily jerks a nd physiological reactions. 62 In fact, the
physical "participation" of the spectator in this sense affor?s the
startle its exceptional status. Baird celebrates the startle as eVldence
of a prehistoric remnant of Man. If Baudelaire wished to galvanize
the intensity of a lived moment onto the page at the expense of
experience, Baird is happy to activate his slumbering biology into
seizure. They "engage our psychophysiologies, and, for an hour or s.o'
mock and remember mortality ... as well as "reaffirm the animalistic,
atavistic and irrational" qualities of the human." 63 The author
separates a form of life present in abrupt, involuntary, physical
shocks from a li fe that had forgotten its subjection to death. The
irrational animal is thus confined within the rational human as an
erratic and primordial effect. The principal figure of both the "shock"
and the startle is an involuntary subject In Baudelaire, this figure
anticipates the poem; for Baird, that subject is located in and throu~h
the film as an exception. In turn, it is re-inserted into Cloverfield In
the dual role of the camera. Between the poetic work of Baudelaire,
photography, and film, we see an operation in which the exception,
as an a-historical, unmediated, and de-serial event is integrated into
the artistic productio n as the rule. This movement is characterized
more by its velocity than its particular medium, and this velocity
coincides w ith the spectator's alienation from the events. The
"physiological" element of the startle at every moment colors the
film. But the film translates this into objective and visual language,
formalizing it into a technique. Baird outlines the essential
characteristics of the fil m star tle effect: "(1) A character presence, (2)
an implied off-screen threat, a nd (3) a disturbing intrusion into the
character's immediate space."64 In Baird's model, th e character
serves as an intermediary between the "involuntary subject" and the
catalyst, but in Cloverfield, this subj ect is the ever-present medium.
The monster is only visible in short glin1pses, a nd not until the end
61
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do we get a somewhat sustained view of it. The "immediate space" of
the characters is constantly disturbed by the destruction around
them.
In sifting through the archival record of the Holocaust-- perhaps
the most extreme and sustained example of the normativization of
the state of exception in history-- Agamben locates a lacuna in the
testimony of the Auschwitz survivors. The lacuna appears by virtue
of the fact that the survivors bore witness to an event that language
cannot give account The extreme figure of Auschwitz was the
Muse/mann, to whom starvation and abuse had taken its toll,
reducing him to a near vegetative state. The Muse/mann was the
"complete witness" who, by virtue of this condition, cannot bear
witness to the event65 He can only be spoken for by that part of the
human that survives the inhuman. In the same way, the "imagined
substance"66 of the /, impenetrable to the discourse that it initiates
nonetheless survives the discourse as a remnant of the speaker, who
in term, testifies on its behalf. At the beginning of Cloverfield, the text
against the black screen informs the viewer that the following
footage is the property of the Department of Defense, recovered from
a digital hand-held camera in an area that was once New York's
Central Park. We are not told why we are given this viewing or in
what context we are watching it But we know that the same state of
order that preceded the catastrophe is still in force at the end. This
recording, held somewhere in an archive, survives Marlena, Hud, Rob
and Beth.
At the end of the film, there is a scene in which Rob and Beth
take refuge beneath a bridge in Central Park. They each face the
camera and say a few words before we hear a crash and the camera
flickers off. Presumably they die. If they had lived, the illusion of the
film, contingent upon their deaths, would have evaporated. This is
the novelty of Cloverfield: the death of the living becomes coupled
with the survival of the dead object (the camera), allowing the
infinite reproducibility of a singular event, and the radically passive
observer can witness that which even the characters cannot. The
camera and death bind the characters to both themselves and to us
at the very place in which the bind is compromised. The camera is a
more "authentic" witness than a survivor because its objective status
lends the recording continuity at the point in which subjectivity
recedes into terror, taking its own survival as its object. Where
65
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language left a void in the archive of Auschwitz, the camera is
capable of bridging that void through disengaged recording. The
objective and technological faculties of the camera hold the
exception, and the bare life that arises as its subject, in a suspended
captivation that survives the rupture of transmission. Even a period
as intangible as a startle, has been captured in studies using highspeed cinematography.67 Benjamin was hopeful for film, believing
that reproducibility "emancipated the work of art from its parasitic
dependence of ritual."6B For centuries art had been aligned so closely
with its origins in time and space. The criterion of its value was its
authenticity--emanating as an "aura"--, which was grounded onto its
physical locus and "the testimony to the history which it had
experienced."69 Because reproducibility is inherent in the
photographic image, the image would loose itself from tradition, and
art would move towards the realm of politics.70 In film, according to
Benjamin, the aura of the actor is tied to his presence and is
dissolved in its cinematic projection.7 1 This is because, as he claims,
presence "cannot be replicated." 72 An expression or gesture
originating from a theater actor on a traditional stage is manifestly
different from that of an actor in film. In Benjamin's terms, presence
cannot be replicated insofar as it is always associated with the
physical locality of the subject But, as is seen in Cloverfield, it can be
approximated as a representation through the separation of
intentionality and act, which is accidental in nearly all films, a formal
element of Cloverfield's production. In theater, intention and act
(gesture and speech) are part of the same expression, whereas in
film (and this will be more clear later) gesture and intention occur
intermittently within, and despite of, speech and act. Cloverfield is
exceptional because it incorporates the camera as an unintentional
subject, which makes possible the exhibition of a form of subjectivity
suspended at times in pure intentionality. This is best demonstrated
in scenes of terror and flight, in which a monster diverts the intended
course of action that is re-constituted, diverted again, and so on. In
the midst of this struggle, the viewer glimpses a form of being whose
actions proceed despite of intent, and intent never resolves itself in
Baird, "The Startle Effect: Implications for Spectator Cognition and Media Theory,"
21.
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70
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action. Besides their recent political significance, terror, selfpreservation, and being-towards-death, all describe a form of being
dissociated from formal processes of signification and delivered over
to the viewer in self-exhibition.

24
In the state of exception, which I have discussed as a fictional
space, the breakdown of norms creates a situation in which violence
escapes management. Benjamin writes that "violence, when not in
the hands of law, threatens it, not by the ends that it may pursue, but
by its mere existence outside of the law." 73 Violence, as a normal and
legitimate operation, is reduced to a state of "mere existence" when
it is dissociated from official sanction. As discussed in the case of the
iustitium, "necessity" becomes the operative mechanism that
guarantees the legitimacy of violence in a juridical void as it binds
the self-preservation of the citizen to the self-preservation of the
state. In the following discussion of 24, I want to present the show as
a play between the tensions of legitimate and illegitimate violence in
the state of exception. For those unfamiliar with 24, it is centered on
the character Jack Bauer, a member of the CTU (Counter Terrorist
Unit). The novelty of the show is its use of real time. Each episode is
one hour (approximately 42 minutes after commercials), and it
represents that hour in real time, while each season is twenty-four
hours. The show is premised upon the ticking bomb dilemma. 74 At
the beginning of every season, Jack Bauer uncovers an insidious
terrorist plot (assassination attempt, nuclear bomb, virus, etc.), while
the viewer follows his exploits in real time. Predictably, the show
becomes almost a vehicle for the exhibition of torture and, at the
same time, a mechanism for ensuring a perpetual bond between
violence and the law. As a result, the character of Jack Bauer begins
to approximate the anthropogenic condition of the animal.
In The Open, Agamben seeks to understand "life" as a result of a
series of divisions between animal and man. Because life cannot be
readily defined, it appears that, for this very reason, it "must
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ceaselessly be articulated and divided." 75 Historically speaking,
"Man" is "always the place-and at the same time, the result," of
these divisions.76 Every attempt to articulate man implicates a rezoning of the terrain of animal and vice-versa. This interminable
articulation culminates in Heidegger's concept of the "open" as the
proper dwelling place for Dasein. Heidegger's attempt to map the
terrain of the openness of Dasein forces him each time in tandem to
ground the animal in the "not-open."77 It is no accident then that ~is
method and terminology begin to resemble that of the ecologtst,
Jacob von Uexkall. 78
Uexkall was interested in the possibility of translating the
perceptions of animals in their own "phenomenal world or the selfworld of the animal."79 The agency (effector world) and perception
(perceptual world) of the animal are to be understood as a clo~ed
system, the Umweft.BO The animal is bound within a field of specific
stimuli, or "carriers of significance (what Heidegger calls,
'disinhibitors')," that serve as perceptual and effector cues to the
organism. For example, the Umwelt of a tick is comprised of a small
series of cues (butyric acid, heat) to which the receptor and effector
organs of the tick respond.s1 The "poverty" of this tiny world of
receptor /effector cues "guarantees the unfailing certainty of her
actions," Uexkall writes, "and security is more important than
wealth." 82
According to Heidegger, the open is the place in which the
animal is "exposed [to Dasein] without disconcealment."83 Animals
are situated within a coordinate system of cues and are impotent to
deactivate them. Humans are the ones who witness this poverty and
even more, arrive at the closedness of animality by means of
subtraction, or "destructive observation." 84 In order to contain his
desire to inflict pain for the sake of his own self, 24 throws Jack
Giorgio Agamben, The Open trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004), 13.
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Bauer into a whirlwind of events that manages his desires and
organizes acts of violence within the constraints of the necessary
circumstances. Hegel states that work is "desire held in check."85 And
while jack is a member of the CTU~ his activities are not solely linked
to his "work~~ at the CTU administration~ nor are they carried out
under its guidance. This is a characteristic feature of the show. Jack
evades orders and official protocol. During the early part season one~
CTU agents investigate him even as he continues his own
investigations. In one scene~ he actually resigns from the CTU so that
he can torture a man for information.86 He isn~t bound to the law by
virtue of its institutions or decrees~ but to necessity~ which the law
claims as its own. He traverses a field of effector/receptor cues in
which he is held in captivation and suspense. Time constrains his
actions and expiates him of guilt. The show's creators wanted to give
their characters~ "no time to think in ordinary terms because the
dilemmas they face are so overwhelming."B7
The element of time allows latitude in the numerous torture
scenes that have invited criticism as well as popularity. I am not
going to talk specifically about the torture scenes here~aa as they are
a source of much media discussion. Critics tend to accuse the show of
portraying excessive violence or using unrealistic or improbable
situations to endorse the exhibition of violence. But such critiques
fail to appreciate the truly "novel" aspects of the show~ in terms of its
production as well as its moral value. In the case of the latter, 24 puts
into play the mythic "force of law" that intercedes at the limit point of
juridical competence. The limit point is the crisis that motivates and
sustains the plot. By consigning jack Bauer to the closed place of
animal innocence and captivation and aligning his self-security to
From the chapter "Lordship and Bondage," in G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit.
trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 118.
86 joel and Robert Cochran Surnow, "12:00am-1:00am," in 24 Season 5 (television
broadcast) (United States: Fox Network, 2001).
87 james Surowiecki, "Confessions of a 24 Writer," Slate Magazine 2006.
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that of the law~s~ the producers of the show can endlessly inscribe
violence into the plot and~ at the same time~ guarantee the "moral~~
coloring of such violence. Walter Benjamin described "mythic
violence" (lawmaking violence) in terms of Classical mythological
archetypes in which violence is not simply a means towards some
end~ but a "manifestation/' of lawmaking power itself.89 And while
jack's actions are always in accordance with the end goal of averting
a terrorist attack~ his actions are almost always unmediated by
official sanction. In season 5 he uncovers a plot linked to the U.S.
President90 He kidnaps the president in a feigned attempt to get a
confession. Throughout the series~ the CTU is ridden with internal
strife and suspicion of inter-departmental espionage. And then of
course, the acts of torture are technically illegal. In other words, Jack
Bauer deploys a juridically formless kind of violence carefully
orchestrated within a field of crisis and captivation through which
we see the specter of "force of lawn in which the violent act occurs as
an exception to the norm, but nonetheless acquires legal "force" at
the moment of application.
24 enacts a truly mythic characteristic of sovereign violence: the
agent of extra-judicial violence maintains his innocence. Executive
producer Howard Gordon remarked, "jack is this really tragic
character ... He's really the walking damned. He can't have the life the
rest of us have. He kind of bleeds for our sins." 91 The concept of jack
as hero-martyr has a new meaning in the Western literary tradition.
The term "tragic" must be seen in contrast from its Classical use.
Hegel, in his study of Greek tragedy, warns of associating innocence
with the Greek tragic hero, and, for that matter, determining that
innocence upon the hero's restrained subjectivity. "For [the Greeks],~~
he states, "the bond between the subject and what he wills as his
object remains indissoluble ... No worse insult could be given to such
a hero than to say he acted innocently. It is the honor of these
characters that they are culpable."9Z The plight of the hero,
according to Benjamin, "invalidate[d] the ancient rights of the
Olympians" and broke "the hold of demonic fate" from the hun1anity
that revered him (or her).93 In other words, the tragic hero of the
1
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Greeks performed the rites of liberation fro m the very "demonic fate"
that constrains jack Bauer. By constructing the character in such a
way, the producers a re able to localize violence onto a single
character, but at the same time, remove the character from the
ethical, legal, or moral responsibility of those acts. Hence we can
watch the application of sovereign violence that is wholly divested
from a corporeal place of origin: a specter of sovereign power within
the state of exception. When jack Bauer states, as a prel ude to a
torture, "I need to do whatever is necessary to stop this nuke from
being used against us,"9 4 he is articulating the bond by which the
state of necessity ties the subject's self-p reservation to the
sovereign's, annexing the viol ence of the former to the latter. When
he tells a policewoma n, "Cops have to play by the r ul es. I have to
break a few with this guy,"9S and, even more, when he resigns from
the CTU so that he can torture a suspect, he is br idging the state of
exception to the rul e, ensuring the continui ty of law. And where
violence threatens to become a n object fo r jack's own use, he
assumes the sile nt gesture of guilt on his face that, in ta ndem w ith his
mantra, "what needs to be done," divests him of his last vestige of
will and returns to him an impotent, if fleeti ng, token of "humanity."
Tellingly enough, this very sentiment is echoed by General Patrick
Finnegan, who, in a critique of the scenes of tor tu re, stated
hesitantly, "The disturbing thing is that although tor ture may cause
jack Ba uer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do."96
Time is an invisible protagonist in the show, and it dually
consigns jack Bauer as well as his watchers, to a n inoperative
position. In th e case of jack, he is captivated in a fi eld of
effector/receptor cues that motiva te his actions while holding his
own being-for-himself in check. The viewer is bound in time to a
perceptual world centered the Umwelt of jack. At times the fi eld is
divided, showing multiple subject worlds in simultaneous time.
Either way, the view er is fully engaged to a world that is fully
disengaged from his or her intervention; at the same time, the world
that engages the viewer-- jack's world-- is "exposed without
disconcealment." This isn't to say that 24 is radically different from
the medium of film in general, but the difference is of degree, not

kind. One luxury of watching film is the fact that a narrative can play
out in summary time. This is even more so in literature, where the
procession of silence is impossible. As a production, we are given
precisely that which we were intended to see.
In his discussion of cinema, Gilles Deleuze contrasts what he
calls a "movement-image" to a "time-image." The former contains its
own description (like an ostensible gesture of emotion) and, as such,
is not subordinate to time. The latter is contained in and through
time, exemplified in post-World War II cinema in which the seque~ce
of frames was commensurable with real-time perception. According
to Deleuze, the perception of the time-image in contemporary
cinema is a radical departure from that of the prior movementimages, because, while the latter references a thing outside of. the
image, and thus requires the cognitive intervention of the subject,
the former, as it represents time directly, leaves no room for such
intervention.97 The radical passivity involved in viewing the timeimage of cinema implicates a new form of subjectivity that does not
necessarily correspond to activity, but to "pure perception." 98 In 24,
the "moral" function of time corresponds to its sequencing. Jack's
actions do not necessarily reference norms, institutions, or decree~;
he dispenses "justice" outside of the law, which opens up an anomie
and contestable space that is immediately annexed to state of
necessity. The manifestation of pure lawmaking power is p~stured
onto the pure manifestation of time. Because such power IS no.nreferential, it is made real, as a representation, through Its
irreducible presence. In 24, time is not allowed to escape, b~ca.use
within it a nd through it, the state of exception occurs. The tickin~
bomb dilemma can never be "resolved" in a forma l sense, because It
requires a moral judgment in a place that does not cite morality, but
only exhibits itself as pure event in the irreducible duration of tim~.
Deleuze suggests cinema constitutes a forn1 a perc~ption
"anterior to all significance," upon w hich signification is possible.99
. · 'tylOO th a t
At the same time, he implicates a new form o f su bJectiVI
recognizes itself through the pure duration tin1e.101 This subjectivity
is vested with a fo rm of perception origina ry to signification. How
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Caleta
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 271.
90 Temenuga Trlfonova, "A Nonhuman Eye: De leuze on Cinema," Substance 33, no. 104:
Special Section: Contemporary Novelist Lyd ie (2004): 139.
99
Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Tim e-Image, 262.
100 Ibid., 4 7.
101
Ibid., 87.
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can a subjectivity so attached to a cinematic experience precede that
experience? For that matter, why is the act of viewing so attached to
this subjectivity? To answer this, I will come back to the discussion of
the "open" via Heidegger's metaphysics of boredom.
Heidegger identifies boredom as the condition in which Dasein
achieves its place in the open, but, paradoxically through this
process, comes to occupy the "closest proximity" to the world of the
animaJ.loz "In becoming bored, by something," Heidegger observes,
"we are precisely still held fast by that which is boring, we do not yet
let it go, or we are bound to it for whatever reason."l03 Or, as
Benjamin states, "We are bored when we don't know what we are
waiting for."l0 4 Boredom is a force that draws us and, at the same
time, refuses to reveal that to which we are drawn. The animal,
which is held in captivation to its disinhibitors (receptorI effector
cues), begins to coincide with Dasein, who is held in captivation by
boredom. "In becoming bored," states Agamben, "Dasein is delivered
over to something that refuses itself exactly as the animal, in its
captivation, is exposed in something unrevealed. "Jos Rather than th e
open being radically distant from the animal world, it is found "only
by means of a suspension and a deactivation of the animal relation
with its disinhibitor." 106 Through this "destructive observation"
something like an "open" is realized.
Deleuze, in his search for a pure subject, finds common ground
with Heidegger in his search for the "open." Heidegger can only
locate the open through the metaphysics of boredom, which, in turn,
brings Dasein into the "closest proximity" with the animal, and
Deleuze can only grasp "pure perception" in close proximity to the
experience of cinema. In both cases, the object of observation is both
captivating to and captivated by an "emancipated" subject whose
being-as-such is vested within a duration of time. To Heidegger, this
duration carries the subject being held in suspense by boredom,
while to Deleuze, time is residually present in a subjectivity ·given
over to pure perception. Both of these thinkers "arrive" at the
authentic subject through a process of subtraction, grounding the
102

Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1995), 92. Cited in Agamben, The Open 62.
1o3 Agamben, The Open 62.
104
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 150.
10s Agamben, The Open 65.
106 Ibid., 68.

98

subject to an irreducible form of being that evades representation.
The animal that stands exposed before Dasein guarantees a mutual
and non-exchangeable relation of presence, that is, "animality" is
always the being-exposed-before-Dasein. The animal, whose
presence is always represented to Dasein in exposure opens up the
possibility of an authentic presence of non-exposure for Dasein, that
is, a presence not given over to re-present activity. The subject who
is given over to the cinematic experience shares this same relation of
presence, in that "pure perception" is given over to virtual
representation of that perception on the screen, leaving the residue
of a subject ontologically presen t in and through the duration of the
experience. Cloverfield and 24 are unique, but are perhaps also
representative amongst film. They also demonstrate the impulse by
which artistic production seizes upon the elemental, irreducible, and
exceptional forms of being and offer them up to knowledge as
representations. The "shock" becomes a principle of poetic
production, formalized in film, leaving the residue of an involuntary
subject that Baird identifies through the startle effect. His subject is
grounded in activity, barely perceptible in time, while Deleuze's
subject is grounded in inactivity, present in time. Cloverfield captures
the former and 24, the latter. These two subjects are perhaps two
sides of the same coin, the product of a tradition that sought the
authenticity of being through imminence on one hand, and that of
transcendence on the other. This operation functions at a normative
and political level as well. In structuring the plot onto the irreducible
duration of time, and structuring the actions of Jack Bauer within a
"disinhibiting ring," the state of exception is given over to the moral
world as an object of perception. The incompossible presence of the
de-serial, singular event and the witness to the event -the state of
exception and the rule-- is overcome in a relationship of mutual
suspension and captivity. 24 opens up a world fully vested with its
own self-referencing in terms of both morality and mere
signification. The being-moral and the being-animal of Jack Bauer
collapse onto his own person, stripping away the very possibility of
signification upon which the distinction of the two are possible. The
viewer is left with a form of life and law that can only reveal itself in
and through the pure duration of time, and in the act of revealing
itself, holds the viewer in suspense and captivation. If "boredom is
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the threshold to great deeds," as Benjamin thinks, 107 cinema erects a
screen at that threshold.
V. FESTIVAL OF MOURNING
According to Agamben, anomie feasts such as funeral
processions of the emperor and Carnival originated from the
iustitium mentioned above. The legal declaration of iustitium in a
state of siege brought about the possibility of pure anomie unleashed
in the city. It carried over to the funeral rights of the sovereign.
Violent riots followed the death of Caesar, for instance, but, over
time, the death of the sovereign became an occasion for public
mourning.1oe The rupture of legal continuity, which was embodied in
the sovereign, was "ritualized and controlled, transforming the state
of exception into public mourning and mourning into iustitium. 109
The anomie license attributed to celebrations like Carnival can be
seen as the ordering of the exception into the juridical sphere,
ensuring its continuity through the ritualized spectacle of legal
transgression. 11 Cloverfield, 24, and perhaps the entire spectrum of
entertainment constitute our celebrations of power and the anomie
festivals that bridge the gap between the death of the sovereign and
the reinstitution of its legacy. In Cloverfield, we witness the
catastrophic space, opaque to legal representation, strategically
restored upon the constituted order. At the same time, it
emancipates the life that dwells in catastrophe-- that is, the life that
binds itself to itself in terror-and gives it over to the world as a
representation. The film celebrates the triumph of a biopolitical
struggle that, in one of modern democracy's great aporias, "put the
freedom and happiness of men into play in the very place-'bare
life'-that marked their subjection. 111 jack Bauer, on the other hand,
is the tragic hero of our time. He "solves" the endless debates on
torture and the ticking bomb by casting aside contingency. Benjamin
noted of Baroque tragedy, "The prince, who is responsible for
making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at
the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a
decision." 112 jack Bauer arrives to intercede at these moments. At

the same time, his poverty in the world guarantees that his violence
will be contained within the law, which claims necessity as its own.
Even more, the gap that separates the pure event of necessity from
the determinateness of the law is traversed by our own perceptual
field that holds us captive in the "closest proximity'' to the
captivation of jack Bauer. Thus, we have mutually captivated
subjects, in which the captivation of the one founds that of the other.
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KATHY MAC

0MAR KHADR IS NOT HARRY POTTER

"Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."
-George W. Bush

"... the world isn't split into good people and Death Eaters. "
-Sirius Black
The twinning which is the subject of this paper first arose simply out
of the observation that media coverage of Omar Khadr frequently
noted his love of the Harry Potter stories 1. Khadr discussed Potter at
length with fellow Guantanamo prisoners, his lawyers, UN prisoner
advocates, even his interrogators 2 • The fictional hero's triumph over
institutionalization, exploitation and evil must have resonated with
the adolescent Afghani Canadian, captured on an Afghani battlefield
in 2002 when he was fifteen. Deeper consideration of the two child
soldiers reveals startling differences in the wars which formed them.

0MAR KHADR'S DEFENSE CANNOT BE HARRY POTTER'S DEFENSE

Harry Potter belongs to an old-fashioned sort of conflict and his story
is at heart a familiar bildung in which the hero develops what he needs
- combat skills, eloquence, the ability to lead both by example and by
inspiring others - to succeed at a necessary task which he alone can
complete. In the process of developing those skills, at the age of
fourteen, Potter is forced to meet his nightmarish enemy in a
graveyard. He first defies Voldemort and then fights: "he was going to
die trying to defend himself, even if no defense was possible"3 . Because
of Potter's resolve to protect himself, he lives.

1 C. F.

60 Minu tes, Friscolanti, Shephard Guantanamo's Child, etc.
Michelle Shephard, Guantanamo's Child: The Untold Story ofOmar Khadr. (Toronto:
John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 107,174, 175, 194.
3 Ibid., 575.
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